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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a public
entity,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 870236

JUANITA IRENE BURGE, ROBERT
D. BARROWS, JR; BEATRICE
IRENE BARROWS; et. al.
Defendants/Appellants

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A reading of plaintiff's Statement of Facts in its Brief
of Respondents

(RDA) would cause one to conclude that the

plaintiff was an uninterested bystander in bringing about the
redevelopment of Block 57.

It would have us believe that any

problems with the acquisition of the subject property or
other parcels on the block would be of concern only to
Lincoln or the neighboring owners, but not to the plaintiff.
Its summary1 of the Order conveys the impression

it was

nothing more than a typical Order of Immediate Occupancy
pursuant to § 78-34-9 Utah Code Ann.
1

By not mentioning the

Brief of Respondents, pp. 6-7.
1

fact that it obtained an option from the owners to purchase
the subject property and agreed to pay interest accruing
before

possession

was

transferred

one would

be

lead

to

conclude that these must be unimportant provisions of the
Order.

The fact is that the plaintiff as the Redevelopment

Agency of Salt Lake City was charged with the responsibility
for the successful redevelopment of Block 57.
Lincoln

to be

its developer

from among

It had chosen

others who were

interested and it had agreed with Lincoln to use its powers
of eminent domain if necessary to expedite the project.

But

the decision of Judge Uno had cast a cloud upon its power of
eminent

domain

to

acquire

any

of

Block

57

because

of

procedural defects on the part of plaintiff affecting the
whole project.
Plaintiff was under

increasing pressure to at least

begin development of the north one-third of the block, but
Lincoln was losing interest and the plaintiff was anxious to
immediately execute with Lincoln an ADL agreement by which
Lincoln would
redevelopment.

commit to the project and begin

immediate

Lincoln would not sign unless it was assured

that the plaintiff had the right to acquire the necessary
property.
action

Plaintiff,

against

the

therefore,

subject

filed

property

its

which

condemnation
was

the only

remaining parcel not yet secured in the north one-third of
2

the block.

But plaintiff's subsequent Motion for an Order of

Immediate Occupancy was contested by the owners.
Because it was imperative that the ADL be signed without
delay plaintiff sought a 60 day option from the owners to
establish plaintiff's right to purchase the property.

It was

anticipated 60 days would be required to complete the signing
of the ADL and to pay the owners $76,450.00 of the purchase
price.2

As consideration for the option the first draft of

the contract set forth plaintiff's promise to pay interest to
accrue from the date of the option3 for up to three years.
This was payable on the condition that within thirty days the
owners gave the plaintiff possession, otherwise the Order
would be void.4

This deadline for the early transfer of

possession was not acceptable to the owners who wanted to
hold the property during the period in which interest was
accruing.

As a result the final draft of the Order left

paragraph 1(a) unchanged in requiring interest to accrue from
the date of the option, but any deadline or time frame by
2

The
the
was
not

3

The option became effective upon execution of the
Order by the parties, its entry with the court, and
deposit with the clerk of $275,220.00.

4

Paragraph 1(b) of the draft of the Order attached
to Brief of Appellants as Exhibit "B".

neighbors agreed to contribute $76,450.00 to
owners if the ADL were signed. Since the ADL
not signed those provisions in the contract are
discussed herein.

3

which time possession had to be transferred was removed from
paragraph 1(b) along with removal of the provision that the
contract would be void if possession were not transferred.
The time for transfer of possession was no longer a condition
which could render the contract void.

The time for the

accruing of interest remained unrelated to when plaintiff
would take possession as provided in both drafts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's purpose for entering into the contract was
to remove any bar to the signing of the ADL and to open the
way for its signing by removing any cloud upon plaintiff's
right or power to acquire the property.

It was not necessary

that the plaintiff obtain actual possession of the property.
It was only necessary that it establish it had the right to
take possession and obtain title.

The bar to the signing was

removed when plaintiff received the owners' promise to give
possession, thereby opening the way for the signing of the
ADL and
plaintiff

commencement
was

of redevelopment activities.

directly

responsible

for the

Since

redevelopment

success of the block it was directly benefited by the option
which opened the way for the signing of the ADL.

Plaintiff

must pay for this benefit.
Also, the statute construed in the Dade County case5
5

Dade County v. Briaham. 47 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950).
4

resembles more nearly § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953,
than the statutes construed in any of the other cases cited
by the parties and is precedence for allowing an award for
expert witness fees incurred by the owners.

The intent and

purpose of the statute is to more fully compensate the owner
beyond

simple

"just compensation", and "costs" should be

given a broader meaning than mere taxable "court costs".
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF THE
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY AND HAS AN
OBLIGATION TO PAY INTEREST AS PROMISED
As a preliminary matter the Brief of Appellants did not
set forth as alleged by plaintiff an offer to offset interest
agreed to by crediting plaintiff with the rental
received by the owners.6

income

Plaintiff's quote from page 37 of

the Brief of Appellants stated that offsetting the interest
payments due would only be proper in the event this court
determined that possession was a condition precedent to the
payment
following

of

interest.

that

quoted

This
by

was

stated

plaintiff.

in the
The

sentence

owners

deny,

however, that the transfer of possession to the plaintiff was
such a condition for the plaintiff's payment of interest.
Plaintiff's refusal to pay interest is based upon the
6

Brief of Respondents, page 10.
5

following assertions:

(1) It did not obtain possession of

the prop€*rty due to a withdrawal by the owners of the funds
on deposit, but instead was required to prove at trial it's
right of eminent domain in order to obtain possession.

(2)

Obtaining possession under paragraph 1(b) of the Order was
the only consideration provided by the Order for its payment
of

interest

and

it did

not

obtain possession.

(3) It

received no benefit under the Order, and (4) the Order is
void, therefore no interest is owing.
discussion

of

these

matters

in

the

In addition to a
owners'

Brief

of

Appellants the owners reply as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's right and power of condemnation was not

an issue at trial.

The plaintiff did not have the right to

take the property even though the owners were not parties to
Judge Uno's decision that was adverse to the owners.

His

decision placed a cloud upon the right of the plaintiff to
condemn any of the properties on Block 57 due to procedural
irregularities common to the whole block.

But at trial this

precedent was not argued by the owners.

Plaintiff merely

offered

resolutions

into

evidence

copies

of

it's

and

proceedings to which no objection was made nor was argument
offered against plaintiff's right of eminent domain.

Any

statement by plaintiff to the contrary7 is not supported by
7

Brief of Respondents, page 9.
6

the record.

Nor does plaintiff deny that prior to trial an

agreement to the contrary was reached between Mr. Oswald and
Mr. Evans8 in which the owners agreed to waive their defense
denying plaintiff's right of eminent domain, in order to
avoid

plaintiff's

abandonment

of these proceedings

as a

result of Judge Uno's ruling.
2.

Possession was not consideration for payment of

interest.

Plaintiff says possession was consideration for

interest payments because, (a) paragraph 1(b) of the original
draft of the Order says so and the only reason for its
revision was to make its provision "self-executory"9, and (b)
it would be incongruous for the owners to receive interest
during the same period it is collecting rent.
(a)

Revision of draft of Order.

Plaintiff argues that

since the original draft of paragraph
required

the

transfer

of

possession

1(b) of the Order
for

interest

to be

payable this must be the meaning of the final draft also
since

the

only

purpose

for the change was to make

its

provision "self-executory" by eliminating a need to file a
motion to have the Order vacated.

Eliminating the need to

file a motion was not the purpose of the change.

A motion to

vacate was simply no longer needed because the Order would no
8

Brief of Appellants, page 36.

9

Brief of Respondents, page 8.
7

longer

be

"null

and

void"

as

it

could

have under

the

provisions of the first draft.
The main thrust of the revision went to remove the
deadline in the draft by which time the owners were required
to withdraw at least part of the funds.

Under the first

draft if the owners did not transfer possession within thirty
days they lost their opportunity to be paid the interest
(unless the ADL was signed).

The final Order removed that

deadline so the owners could now withdraw the funds "as
herein provided".

No deadline was provided.

It would bring

about an incongruous result to remove from the Order a time
limit

for the withdrawal

of funds and then penalize the

owners through a finding that they had failed to withdraw
funds in a timely manner causing them to lose the accrued
interest.

Plaintiff's argument that the Order is "void"

should not be upheld when the language of the draft was
removed that stated that the Order would become "null and
void" if possession were given.
(b)

Payment to the owners of both rent and interest is

consistent

with

the

preliminary

matter

provisions

of

the

Order.

it should be noted that there

As

a

is no

evidence as to the amount of rent collected by the owners
during the twenty-two months this action was pending contrary

8

to plaintiff's allegations.10

At the time of the entry of

the final Order of Condemnation most of the tenants were in
default in their payments and rents remain in arrearage to
this date.

As the time approached for the tenants to face

eviction they seemed to lose incentive to remain current on
their rents.
Receipt by the owners of both interest and rent for the
same period is consistent with the Order because the date
interest

begins

accruing

transfer of possession.

is different

from

the date of

Paragraph 1(a) provides for interest

to accrue from the date of deposit of the funds, which also
is the effective date of the owners option to sell.

As noted

above there is no time frame for the transfer of possession.
Even under the original draft of the Order requiring the
owners to withdraw funds within thirty days of their deposit,
interest was still accruing during that thirty day period
before possession had to be transferred.

During that time

the owners could still be collecting rents.

Had interest

been consideration for the transfer of possession there would
had been no reason to even require the deposit of funds with
the clerk until the time for the transfer to take place.
By

way

of

clarification

plaintiff

Brief of Respondents, page 9.
9

stated

that

the

landowners are claiming interest for twenty-two months. 11
fact

the

landowners

are

claiming

the

right

to

In

receive

interest during the full thirty-six months provided for in
paragraph 1(a) of the Order.

During the fourteen months

following payment in full of the funds on deposit as ordered
by the trial court interest should be paid at 11.5 percent
less

the

highest

interest

rate

available

for

federally

insured ciccounts, which rate should be determined by the
trial court upon remand.

The plaintiff is obligated to make

up the "shortfall or difference between the actual interest
earned by virtue of the clerk's investment (at the highest
interest rate available for federally insured accounts) and
the 11.5 annual percentage rate...."12

It does not matter

whether the funds are invested by the clerk or by the owners
who

received

distribution.

the

funds

pursuant

to

a

court

Ordered

The plaintiff is still obligated to pay that

difference.
3.

Plaintiff was benefited by the owners' option.

Plaintiff argues that it "did not receive any of the rights
and

privileges

of the Order and, conversely,

it is not

obligated for any of the duties imposed by said Order because
11

Brief of Respondents, page 9.

12

Order of Immediate Occupancy, paragraph 1(a), pp 34.
10

the

same

never

plaintiff's

took

brief

effect."13

seek

to

Statements

convey

the

throughout

impression

that

possession was to be the only consideration for the payment
of interest and since it received no possession under the
Order it owes no interest.14

Plaintiff would have this court

treat the contract as a simple Order of Immediate Occupancy
pursuant to § 78-34-9 Utah Code Ann., 1953, under which
possession triggers the running of interest payments, and
that without possession there is nothing that is binding or
that places any duty upon the plaintiff.
What the plaintiff totally fails to address in its Brief
is that possession was not what the Order was all about.
Possession never became

important to the plaintiff.

The

reason plaintiff sought the Order was because it needed to
clear the way for the signing of the ADL agreement so that
Lincoln would begin redevelopment of the Block.15

The ruling

13

Brief of Respondents, page 7.

14

Plaintiff states that the Order contains "terms and
provisions upon which possession pendente lite of
the subject property would be given to the RDA."
(Brief of Respondents, page 2). It's Statement of
Issues states that the question for review is
whether interest should be given "as a condition
for immediate occupancy." (Brief of Respondents,
page 1).

15

"Lincoln expressed interest in commencing the
undertaking only if they could be assured of
acquiring the entire north one-third of Block
57.... It was in this condition that the landowners
11

of

Judge

Uno

together

with

the

owners'

objection

to

plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy cast a
cloud on plaintiff's power to exercise a right of eminent
domain to acquire Block 57. 1 6
Actual possession was not required or necessary for the
signing of the ADL.
construction.

Lincoln was not going to begin immediate

It only required that the plaintiff establish

that it had the right to possession.

That right was granted

by the owners to the plaintiff in the form of an option as
provided in paragraph 1(b) of the Order.

The option took

effect upon the signing and entry of the Order by the court.
Receipt of that option right was the real benefit plaintiff
received for the promise to pay interest as further discussed

herein were approached and became, for all
practical purposes, the last holdouts in that
Block. The RDA filed a Condemnation Action in an
effort to acquire the property and to insure that
Lincoln would have the requisite ground necessary
to undertake the initial development of the Block.
"It was necessary that the RDA obtain at least a
preliminary indication from the court of its right
to acquire the property and, therefore, the agency
sought an Order of Immediate Occupancy." Brief of
Respondents, pp. 4-5. (Emphasis added)
"The effect of Judge Uno's decision was to create
serious impediment to Lincoln properties ability to
develop the Block and create a considerable
negotiation leverage in landowners who may be
dealing with Lincoln property."
Brief of
Respondents, page 4.
12

in the Brief of Appellants.17

That possession was not even

important to plaintiff is evident from the fact that nowhere
in the contract did the plaintiff require the owners to give
up possession if the ADL were not signed.

It was never

contemplated that the plaintiff should be able to accept the
benefit of the owners' promise to not stand in the way of the
signing

of

a ADL without the plaintiff paying

for that

benefit, and that payment was to be in the form of interest
on the deposited funds accruing from date of the option.
The Order was not a unilateral contract in which the
plaintiff made promises to pay interest that were enforceable
only if the owners elected to give possession.

The plaintiff

promised to pay interest and in return the owners promised to
convey

free

and

clear

of

their

plaintiff's right of condemnation.

defenses

against

the

This promise (option) to

give possession opened the way for the signing of the ADL
which was the benefit plaintiff sought.

The fact that the

ADL was not signed nor that the plaintiff did not exercise
its option was not the fault of the owners and in no way
takes away from the fact that the granting of that option was
the bargained for consideration.
with

the terms

17

The owners fully complied

and provisions of the contract

Pp. 24-26.
13

in every

respect.
The fact that the signing of the ADL may also have been
of benefit to Lincoln or neighboring owners does not alter
the fact that it was a direct benefit to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff

was

the

entity

redevelopment of Block 57.

charged

with

the

successful

It was it's duty to enlist a

suitable developer and expedite matters to keep the Block
from sinking
agreement

further
obligated

into economic
the

redevelopment of the Block.

stagnation.

developer

to

The ADL

proceed

with

Had the plaintiff not had a

direct and vital interest in having the ADL signed it would
not have brought bring this condemnation action to acquire
the property, it would not have defended the action brought
before

Judge Uno

by other owners seeking

to defeat the

redevelopment, it would not have signed the contract with the
owners

obligating

itself to deposit

$275,220.00

and pay

interest from the date of the option, nor would it have
entered into other option agreements with the neighbors to
buy their properties.
Plaintiff would have been the first to seek enforcement
of the option if the owners had decided the next day to
withdraw their promise to convey.

The plaintiff would then

not have hesitated to argue that the option was an essential
part of the contract that inured to plaintiff's benefit.
14

4.

Unjust enrichment to the plaintiff would result if

no interest were paid.

It is the owners' position that the

contract is not void, but even if the court were to rule
otherwise plaintiff still received the benefit of the owners
option as discussed above, and under equitable principles
plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if it did not pay value
therefore.18

Plaintiffs duty, responsibility and purpose is

to bring about redevelopment of the Block and accordingly it
was benefited by the contract.

The reasonable value of this

benefit is the interest as provided for in the contract.19
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE AN AWARD
FOR EXPERT WITNESS FEES OR OTHER TRIAL PREPARATION
EXPENSES PURSUANT TO § 11-19-23.9, UTAH CODE ANN., 1953
Plaintiff argues that as used in § 11-19-23.9 Utah Code
Ann.,

1953,

(hereinafter

the

"subject

statute" or

"Utah

statute") "the word •costs' therein does, in fact, include
only the usual and statutorily permitted taxable costs."20
Restitution should be paid when "money was received
under such circumstances that it would give offense
to equity and good conscience to permit the
possessor to retain it." Thermoid Western Co. v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co. 365 P.2d 65, 69, 12 Utah
2d 256 (1961) . "A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to
make restitution to the other."
Restatement of
Restitution § 1.
5A Corbin on Contracts, § 1124, page 15 (1964).
Brief of Respondents, page 25.
15

Plaintiff has cited cases for the holding that fees paid to
expert

witnesses

are

not

part

of

the

general

costs

customarily taxed as court costs such as those authorized by
Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P..

The owners do not contend that the

commonly accepted meaning of "court costs" includes fees paid
to expert witnesses.

They do assert, however, that when a

special statute authorizes an award for expert witness fees,
that legislative intent should be carried out, and § 11-1923.9 Utah Code Ann., 1953, does authorize such an award.
The meaning of "costs" is not always limited to the
narrow definition of "court costs" authorized by the general
cost provisions of Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P.

When "costs" is

used in an expanded context a broader definition should be
given.

This was the point made by the California case cited

at length by the plaintiff.21

It held that the condemnation

statute authorizing an award of costs was limited to the
customary "court costs" because the wording of that statute
was identical to the wording of the general statute regarding
taxation of court costs.

The court went on to clarify,

however, that had the wording been different in "material
particulars"
meaning.

then

"costs"

should

be given

its

special

The court cited with approval a New York City

Brief of Respondents, pp. 20-21.
16

case 2 2

awarding

expert

witness

fees

under

a

statute

authorizing an award of "costs, fees, and expenses".
court

noted

court's

that

"(i)t

construction

different

from

our

would

of

the

appear
special

legislative

that

the

statute,

enactments

The

appellate
which

in

was

material

particulars, was eminently proper."23
The applicable wording of § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, is as follows:
"...(T)he court may,...award in addition to his
just compensation, costs. including a reasonable
attorney's fee as determined by the court. The court...
may also award a reasonable sum as compensation for the
costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner....
An award may also be made for damages to any fixtures or
personal property owned by the owner of such acquired
property...if such fixtures or personal property are
damaged as a result of such acquisition or relocation."
(Emphasis added).
A statute authorizing an award of "costs" when that term
stands alone, or "costs and attorney's

fees" could well

define "costs" to be the usual "court costs" taxable under
Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P.
same

meaning

as

an

But these terms do not convey the
authorization

of

"costs

including

attorney's fees." "Including" connotes that "attorney's fees"
is included within and is part of the meaning of the term
In re Commissioners of Palisades Park. 83 Misc.
Rep. 186, 144 N.Y.S. 782.
The City of Los Angeles v. Vickers, 81 Cal.App.
737, 254 Pac. 687, 688 (1927).
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"costs," hence extending the definition of "costs" beyond the
narrow

"usual

and

urged by plaintiff.

statutorily

permitted

taxable costs"24

This is especially true where "costs" is

used twice in the same section.

In authorizing an award for

"costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner", it
makes

clear

that

the

definition of "costs".

legislature

intended

a

broader

It simply does not make sense if you

replace "costs" with plaintiff's definition.

The legislature

did not intend an award of "usual and statutorily permitted
taxable costs...of relocating the owner".
This is the reason for the owners' reliance upon Dade
County v. Brigham, 47 So.2d 602

(Fla. 1950), attached as

Exhibit "D" to the appendix of the Brief of Appellants.25
The Florida statute being construed was almost identical to
our Utah statute in that it provided that "All costs of
proceedings shall be paid by the petitioner, including a
reasonable

attorney's

fee...."26

Under

such

statutory

24

Brief of Respondents, page 25.

25

Owners also cited Union Exploration Co. v. Moffat
Tunnel Improvement Dist. 89 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1939),
which upheld an award to the owner by "the district
court assessing as costs fees paid by defendant to
it's expert witnesses.
In an equity case the
taxation of costs ordinarily rest in the sound
discretion of the court. §6, chapter 43, 435
C.S.A." (Brief of Appellants, page 41)

26

§ 73.16
added).

Florida

Statute
18

1941, F.S.A.

(emphasis

language the court concluded that:
"When so construed the language §A11 costs of
proceedings...' must be held, in a proper case, to
include fees of expert witnesses for the defendants".
(Id. at 604).
In contrast the statutes being interrupted in the cases
cited by the plaintiff differ materially from the Utah and
Florida statutes so as to limit the value of their holdings.
In those cases the courts are interpreting statutes that
simply

authorize

an

award

of

"costs" without

additional

wording to suggest that anything other than the usual "court
costs" was intended.

The Oklahoma statute simply authorizes

that "all costs in the district court shall be taxed against
him".27

Nevada provided

that "costs may be

allowed".28

California provided that "costs are allowed of course".29
The Utah case cited by plaintiff30 simply holds that expert
witness fees are not taxable as court costs in a wrongful
death

action,

since

there

is

no

specific

statute

so

providing.
It is submitted that in condemnations brought by the
R.D.A.

§ 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, authorizes an

27

69 O.S. 1971 § 1203(e)(f).

28

NRS 37.190.

29

§ 1022, Code of Civil Procedure.

30

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
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award for expert witness fees.

When interrupted in light of

its

purpose

special

wording

and

the

intended

of

fully

compensating the landowners the statute takes the meaning of
"costs" out of the general definition of "court costs" so as
to include expert witness fees necessarily incurred by the
owners.

This is the holding of the Dade County case which

is not a minority view in the interpretation of statutes
similar to Utah's statute.

Plaintiff has cited no cases in

which a statute using similar wording to the subject statute
has been limited to an award of "court costs."
cannot be defined in isolation.

"Costs"

It must be construed in

light of the context in which it is used.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has been benefited by the owners' promises in
the contract and should pay to the owners interest in the
amount of 11.5 percent per annum on the sum of $275,220.00
for three years, less the rate at which the principal would
have earn€»d funds if fully invested at the highest rate
available for federally insured accounts during the period
from June 7, 1987 to August 16, 1988.

Further the provisions

of § 11-19-23.9 Utah Code Ann., 1953 should be interpreted as
authorizing the trial court to make an award to the owners
for

expert

witness

fees

and

other

litigation

expenses

reasonably and necessarily incurred, and that the owners be
20

awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this appeal.
Dated this -^ "~ day of February, 1988,
DART, ADAMSON, & KASTING

Jjllli
[in'

i ruanC

Jojm T. Evans,
Attorney for
Appellants
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